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1. I define an adequate monetary policy model as one that incorporates
dynamics and uncertainty in a plausible manner. We need a state variable
X that changes over time in a partially random manner, and a policy variable
whose time-path is to be specified. Finally, we need an objective function.
2. Consider the stochastic differential equation
dx = f(x, m)dt + g(x, m)dB (1)
governing the state variable. Here f(x, m) is the deterministic drift of
the process per unit time, while g(x, m) is the magnitude of the random
"kick' administered. dB is "white noise" or, more exactly, the differential
of Brownian motion
dB ^ N(0, dt)
having variance equal to time elapsed dt. (In general, x and m are
vector-valued, but in our simple model they are both real-valued.)
3. We are interested in autonomous policies of the form m(x), that is,
chosen m depends on states x but not on calendar time. And of these, we
are interested in policies that, when substituted in (1), make the x-process
ergodic. That is, as t->- oo, x(t) has a distribution that approaches a
limit—the long-term stationary distribution—and furthermore, that this
limiting distribution does not depend on the current state x«
Let P(x) be this limiting distribution; it will in general depend on
the policy m(x) that is chosen (with probability one, P(x) is also the
long-run distribution of the sojourn times in the various states x).
4. Let C(x, m) be the cost function to be minimized. We want it to have the
following property: lim C(x, m) -w as x i®®* uniformly in m (2)
That is, it is bad for |x| to be very large. Under condition (2), any
reasonable policy m(x) will try to reduce |x| when jx] gets large and
this is precisely the condition needed for ergodicity.
5. We now make precise the sense in which C(x,m) is to be minimized.
Non-ergodic policies are simply ruled out as "bad". "Good" policies m(x)
yield limiting distributions P(x), and are to be ranked by the criterion:
Minimize: EC^, m(x))
expectation with respect to P(x), (This yields C^x, m(x^ weighted by
the fraction of time spent in the various states x).
6. Now consider the special case in which f(x, m) is linear, g(x, m) = g
is constant and C(x, m) is quadratic and strictly convex, satisfying (2)
Under these conditions, optimal m(x) is also linear. Substituting in (1) yields
dx = (a - 3x)dt + gdB (3)
for some constants a, 3* 3 >0 is the ergodicity condition.
7. Equation (3) is a Langevin equation. (A model is a spring or rubber-band
subject to random forces). The stationary solution to (3) is an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process (characterized by being stationary, gaussian and markov).
with each x(t) having the distribution
Px ~ (4)23/
8. Now enter money. The variables we shall use are those from the quantity
equation
MV = Y = PQ (5)
where M = money stock, V = velocity, Y = nominal GNP, P = price level,
Q = real GNP, and also r, the nominal interest rate (say the prime
rate).
• d
9. The control variable will be m= M/M (• denotes '^)» the growth rate
of M. (Actually, it is no more complicated to allow for the Fed missing
its monetary target by random shocks. Let actual M/M follow a law of
the form (2) with the drift term being m, targeted monetary growth).
10. From growth theory^ there is a relation between growth rates and
interest rates. For the short-term model in this paper, one must dis
tinguish between the actual interest rate and the equilibrium interest
rate toward which it tends. The latter is the one connected to the growth
rate. Further, the real-world situation is one of a slight gap between
these rates rather than equality. Thus we postulate
equilibrium real interest rate " -q + ijJ (6)
where ijj is the gap. The USA is characterized by Q/Q having a long-term
average of about .03/year, while equilibrium real interest is about .06/year
Thus i/j « .03/year, the value we shall use.
11. Adding P/P to both sides of (6) yields
Y
equilibrium r = — + .03/year (7)
from (5). Actual r tends toward equilibrium r, and the standard partial-
adjustment specification reads
"• . •
1
Y + .03 - r + noise (8)
r = a
("a" = adjustment speed; .3/year seems a ballpark estimate). Here "noise"
summarizes all disturbances, and (8) is a slightly informal rendering of
a stochastic differential equation.
12: Now define x = r - .03/year. This will be our state variable. (8) now
reads
+ noise (9)X = a
Y
Y - ^
13. We need a relation between V and r. r measures the cost of holding
money, hence V rises with r. We postulate
^ =bf +noise (10)
for some adjustment constant b. To estimate it, note that
° ~ dr V (dr vy r
On the right, the first term is the interest-elasticity of velocity, -which
is about .2. Taking a "typical" r of .10/year yields an estimate b = 2 years
14. (10) may also be written as
= bx + noise (12)
Substituting in (9) we get
+ noise = a(m + bx - x) + noise
yielding
X = a
M , V
M+ ?-
X Z3 ~—~ (m - x) + noise (13)
1-ab
(This derivation makes sense only if ab<l, which it is with the estimates above)
15. (13) may be written more accurately as
dx = k(m - x)dt + gdB. (1"^)
for some g, where k = "j—^ ^ basic dynamical law.
16. We now come to the objective function C(x, m). This represents
"real" costs imposed on the economy by disturbances and inefficiencies in
the monetary-financial sector. Think of C(x, m) as the shortfall from some
"natural" growth rate, for example.
17. There are two basic mechanisms imposing these costs. The first is
from disequilibrium in the capital market. If interest rates are above
their equilibrium levels, some marginal projects (especially in construction)
are not worth undertaking, and the economy is in a state of low aggregate
demand, low or negative growth, and recession.
The harm from below-equilibrium interest rates is less clear. The
situation is.one of queuing for credit and capital rationing, and some more
deserving projects may be shelved while less deserving ones are undertaken.
On the other hand, holding interest moderately below equilibrium may yield
a Wicksellian secular boom and be beneficial.
How to represent these effects? Well, by (14), interest rates are
below equilibrium when m- x > 0, and above equilibrium when m- x < 0. This
suggests a cost term of the form
(m - X- c)^ (15)
Here c is a constant, c = o corresponds to over- and under-equilibrium both
being harmful. oO would allow for the asymmetry discussed above and the
possible Wicksellian benefits from below-equilibrium interest.
(One might guess c = .20/year; remarkabl}^ enoughs-optimal monetary
policy turns out not to depend on c at all, so we needn't worry about
estimating it).
18. The second cost arises from monetary inefficiency* People treat money
as a scarce resource though it is not from the viewpoint of society. Thus,
they develop financial intermediaries, ship it from country to country, make
frequent trips to the bank, etc. This effect depends on the level of interest
rates and suggests a cost term of the form
(x - d)^ (16)
Here d is a constant. Probably d is close to zero, and is unlikely to be
more than, say, .04/year.
19. Putting (15) and (16) together yields
C(x, m) = 0(m - X- c)^ + (1 - 9)(x - d) (17)
This is the objective function. Here 9 is a constant between 0 and 1
representing the relative importance of capital-market disequilibrium and
monetary inefficiency. The former seems to be much more important than the
latter, so we take 9 to be (at least) .9.
20. The problem of minimizing (17) subject to (14) may now be solved,
C(x, m) is quadratic and strictly convex, f(x, m) is linear, and g(x, m) is
constant. Under these conditions, optimal policy is linear (see 6). So
write
m = X + yx (18)
and let us determine optimal X and y in terms of the parameters g, k, c, d,
and 6.
21. (18) includes a number of standard policy recommendations. ]i = 0 is
the Friedman policy:, expand Mas a constant rate regardless of other
conditions. (X = .04/year is also Friedman's recommendation, but this
is less crucial).
On the other hand, y = 1 may be described as "accommodating the needs
of trade" by sustaining the current level of interest rates.
22. Substituting (18) into (14) yields the Langevin equation
dx = k(X + yx - x)dt + gdB (19)
23. Comparing (19) with (3) we see immediately that the necessary and
sufficient condition for ergodicity is y <1* Any policy with y >1 is "bad"
and will lead to interest rates wandering arbitrarily far, leading to very
high monetary inefficiency costs. (But we cannot yet exclude, say, y = .99).
24. Taking y <1, then, we obtain the stationary distribution for x from (4)
2
P N
X
X
1-u' 2k(l-y)
(20)
25. Under policy (18), the cost function is
e^i -n) X+c ^+(1 - e)(x - d)^ (21)
The expectation of (21) under distribution (20) is
9 Fx T" 2 -
ec"^ + (1 - 6) 2 + ^
The minimum of (22) over X, ]i occurs at
X
1 - U =
l-(
yielding a minimum value of
2 ^
c +
= d
1-r
y
2k
e(i-y) (22)
(23)
(24)
26. We have a number of remarkable conclusions:
a. Parameters g,ka c play no- role in determining optimal
monetary policy.
b. Policy should be chosen so that the long-term average
value of X ( = r - .03/year) equals (If d = 0, choose
X = 0: monetary expansion is proportional to x).
c. The optimal interest-sensitivity parameter u depends only on
the relative importance of capital-market disequilibrium
vs. monetary inefficiency. If 6 -.9, then U = 2/3 (if 6 = .99,
/s
then U = .9). The Friedman rule y = 0 is correct only if
6 = .5. If 6 = .9 it yields rather excessive capital-market
' disequilibrium costs (this forms the basis for a scenario
on what's wrong with monetarism).
